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Determinants of Voluntary Sustainability Assurance: The Importance of 
Corporate Environmental Performance 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: The main purpose of this study is to investigate whether corporate environmental performance exerts any 
significant influence on the voluntary external assurance of sustainability reports. 
Design/methodology/approach: The sample of this study includes 176 firm-year observations covering an 8-year 
period (2008-2015) for 22 listed Finnish companies that have issued sustainability reports during the sample period. 
As the dependent variable ‘voluntary external assurance’ is a binary variable, a logistic regression model has been 
estimated to observe the effect of corporate environmental performance on the dependent variable. In addition, a 
number of control variables have also been included in the empirical model.  
Findings: The results of this study exhibit that Finnish firms with superior environmental performance in terms of 
GHG emissions and water consumption have their sustainability reports externally assured. Additionally, among the 
control variables, firm size, leverage and asset age are found to have significant impact on the adoption of voluntary 
sustainability assurance. These results are robust as they do not change substantially when conducting sub-sample 
analyses.  
Originality/value: The literature on voluntary sustainability assurance is evolving slowly paying very little attention 
to the association between corporate environmental performance and voluntary sustainability assurance. This 
empirical research aims to extend such scant literature. The results are of paramount importance to users of 
environmental information, managers and regulators.   
Keywords: Voluntary external assurance; Corporate environmental performance; Legitimacy theory; Sustainability 
reports; Propensity to emit GHG; Propensity to consume water; Propensity to produce waste.  
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1. Introduction 
This study examines the importance of corporate environmental performance (CEP) as a 
determinant of voluntary external assurance on sustainability reports issued by corporations. 
Against the backdrop of environmental degradation (e.g., global warming), all kinds of 
stakeholders (i.e., shareholders and other stakeholders) have become critical of corporations for 
their role in inflicting damage (through their activities) on the natural environment. 
Consequently, corporations are increasingly under pressure from these stakeholders to become 
more environmentally responsive, more serious about sustainable development and more 
accountable for their decisions and activities affecting the environment; in response to 
stakeholders’ demand for greater accountability for environmental issues, companies are 
voluntarily and increasingly disclosing different types of environmental information in their 
sustainability reports (Braam et al., 2016). But prior research (e.g., Braam et al., 2016; Cho & 
Patten, 2007; Luo et al., 2012; Cormier et al., 2005) suggests that firms may use environmental 
reporting (ER) as a communication strategy; for instance, firms with superior CEP may use ER 
to send signals to their stakeholders about their relatively good CEP. On the other hand, poor 
environmental performers may use ER to manipulate public perceptions by hiding actual CEP. 
The potential use of ER as an impression management tool by companies raises concerns about 
the reliability and credibility of the reported information in corporate sustainability reports (Cho 
et al., 2012). In the face of the potential loss of stakeholders’ confidence in the credibility of the 
disclosed environmental information, companies are showing a heightened tendency to have 
their sustainability reports externally assured in order to enhance the credibility of the reported 
information, restore stakeholders’ confidence in the same and thus build corporate reputation 
(Simnett et al., 2009; Braam et al., 2016; Al-Shaer and Zaman, 2018).  
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The existing literature suggests that there are only a few studies on the factors influencing the 
implementation of voluntary external assurance on sustainability reports (Ruhnke & Gabriel, 
2013; Gillet-Monjarret, 2015; Al-Shaer and Zaman, 2018). In addition, conclusions of the studies 
investigating the determinants of voluntary sustainability assurance (VSA) are somewhat mixed 
(Ruhnke and Gabriel, 2013). For instance, Simnett et al. (2009) analyze the sustainability reports 
produced by 2,113 companies of 31 countries over the period from 2002 to 2004 in order to 
identify the determinants of VSA and confirm that company-, industry- and country-related 
factors influence firms’ decision to have their sustainability reports externally assured. As 
regards company and industry-related factors, larger companies belonging to environmentally or 
socially sensitive industries are more likely to purchase external assurance for their sustainability 
reports. As far as country-related factors are concerned, companies domiciled in countries that 
are stakeholder-oriented (code law countries where attention is paid to all stakeholders including 
shareholders) and have a rigorous legal environment tend strongly to have their sustainability 
reports externally assured. In contrast to Simnett et al. (2009), Kolk and Perego (2010) find that 
a company’s VSA demand is negatively and significantly associated with the legal environment 
of the company’s country of domicile; the company size is not found to have any significant 
influence on a company’s choice to purchase external assurance as well. However, Kolk and 
Perego (2010) find a greater demand for VSA in code law countries. Ruhnke and Gabriel (2013) 
investigate the determinants of external assurance on sustainability reports issued by companies 
in Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain and report that companies’ decision to purchase 
VSA is linked with the type and scope of the sustainability reporting, the existence of a 
sustainability department, and the size of the company. They reveal further that corporate 
demand for VSA is highest in Great Britain. Gillet-Monjarret (2015) examines the impact of 
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media pressure on the implementation of VSA by 120 French listed companies over the period of 
four years (2007-2010) and finds that media pressure explains the implementation of VSA by 
companies. Peters and Romi (2015) investigate the impact of sustainability governance 
characteristics on VSA of listed US companies (from 2002 to 2010). They reveal that the 
presence of a Chief Sustainability Officer (CSO) on the board of directors is positively linked 
with the adoption of VSA by US companies. In addition, if the CSO has sustainability expertise 
the likelihood of adopting VSA increases. Furthermore, companies that have environmental 
committees consisting of directors with sustainability expertise tend to demand for VSA. Al-
Shaer and Zaman (2018) find that audit committee characteristics such as audit committee 
independence, number of audit committee meetings and financial expertise of audit committee 
members have an impact on the adoption of VSA but the size of the audit committee is not 
associated with the demand for VSA. The preceding discussion on prior research shows the 
scarcity of studies investigating the association between CEP and VSA. This research, drawing 
on legitimacy theory, addresses this gap by exploring the association between CEP and VSA and 
thus contributes to the emerging literature on VSA. 
Legitimacy theory posits that companies are members of society and tap into the scarce resources 
of society (Luo and Tang, 2014). Consequently, it is expected that the actions of companies will 
be “desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 274). In other words, companies are expected to 
operate within the bounds of an acceptable value system in order to continue its existence in 
society (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Gray et al., 1995). In case of failure to meet societal 
expectations on the part of a company, its organizational legitimacy will be threatened and its 
survival will be in question (Sethi, 1979). According to legitimacy theory, a “social contract” 
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exists between companies and the larger social system within which they operate and hence, they 
will continuously seek to conform to the social contract so that their legitimacy is not threatened 
(Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Yunus et al., 2016). The growing public attention on environmental 
issues persuades firms to engage in environmentally responsible practices (Kılıç and Kuzey, 
2019). In order to keep the social contract intact and maintain legitimacy, firms need to inform 
society in general that they are taking their environmental responsibilities seriously (Yunus et al., 
2016) and one way of doing this is to disclose information about their environmentally 
responsible practices via sustainability reports (Kılıç and Kuzey, 2019). Gillet-Monjarret (2015) 
contends that since independent assurance legitimizes the actions of the company, organizational 
legitimacy is strengthened further if the reliability of the information disseminated via corporate 
sustainability reports is ensured by an independent assurance provider. Kolk and Perego (2010) 
add further that companies are adopting VSA for obtaining legitimacy and their assertion is 
reflected in the increased number of businesses implementing VSA over the years (O’Dwyer and 
Owen, 2005). The standing literature suggests that both superior and inferior environmental 
performers tend to provide information about their EP on two different grounds. Firms with good 
EP voluntarily disclose information about their performance in order to distinguish themselves 
from firms with poor EP and thus avoid the problem of adverse selection (Belkaoui and Karpik, 
1989; Clarkson et al., 2008; Luo and Tang, 2014). This argument is in line with voluntary 
disclosure theory (Clarkson et al., 2008; Luo and Tang, 2014; Giannarakis et al., 2017). On the 
other hand, poor environmental performers face threatened organizational legitimacy. As a 
legitimacy repairing strategy, firms with poor EP make increased discretionary environmental 
disclosures so that public perceptions about their actual EP are changed (Clarkson et al., 2008; 
Luo and Tang, 2014). This argument is consistent with the premise of legitimacy theory 
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(Clarkson et al., 2008; Luo and Tang, 2014; Giannarakis et al., 2017). Irrespective of their ‘EP 
type’, firms tend to have their sustainability reports externally assured as assurance establishes 
the reliability and enhances the credibility of the reported environmental information (Simnett et 
al., 2009; Moroney et al., 2012; Gillet-Monjarret, 2015; Braam et al., 2016). 
Given that both superior and inferior environmental performers tend to provide environmental 
disclosures and seek to establish the reliability and improve the credibility of the disseminated 
information, it is expected that an association between CEP and VSA exists and hence, the 
following non-directional hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis: Corporate environmental performance has a significant impact on voluntary 
external assurance of sustainability reports. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the sample and 
methodology used. The results are presented and discussed in section three. Finally, section four 
concludes the paper.  
2. Methods 
2.1. Sample and data 
The sample of this study includes 176 firm-year observations covering an 8-year period (2008-
2015) for 22 listed Finnish companies that have issued sustainability reports during the sample 
period. The availability of data dictates the sample size and the sample period. Finland has been 
used as the research context because of the country’s strong commitment to sustainable 
development. Finland is one of the forerunners to implement the ‘UN 2030 Agenda for 




 The ‘UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ aims at 
ensuring sustainable development in all dimensions: economy, the environment and well-being.
2
 
The UN 2030 Agenda includes 17 goals and 169 targets; there are 200 global indicators 
supplemented by national indicators of individual countries for monitoring progress. Finland is 
not only one of the first countries to put in place national objectives, actions and a monitoring 
and assessment system for attaining the goals of the UN, but also an active participant in the 
international monitoring of the UN 2030 Agenda. At the national level, Finland has introduced 
‘Society’s Commitment to Sustainable Development’, a key instrument for implementing the UN 
2030 Agenda through which the state along with other actors in society such as local 
governments, companies, corporations, civil society and citizens can contribute to the 
implementation of the world’s common development plan.
3
 Finland is also committed to assume 
global responsibility to extend the effect of this contribution beyond its national borders. In this 
empirical research, data on external assurance are retrieved from the sustainability reports of the 
sampled firms and firm-specific data are extracted from Thomson Reuters DataStream database.  
2.2. Variables 
2.2.1. Dependent variable 
Voluntary sustainability assurance is the binary dependent variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
corporate sustainability report is externally assured and 0 otherwise (Simnett et al., 2009; Kolk & 
Perego, 2010; Ruhnke & Gabriel, 2013; Gillet-Monjarret, 2015; Braam et al., 2016; Al-Shaer & 
Zaman, 2018).  
                                                          
1
 This information is sourced from the website https://um.fi/agenda-2030-sustainable-development-goals#inFinland. 
2
 This information is sourced from the website https://um.fi/documents/35732/0/UAM_Kesta%CC%88va%CC%88-
kehitys_A4_EN_18102018%20%281%29.pdf/1a236110-e890-85e2-1aea-e68b2a9df486?t=1540750202357. 
3
 This information is sourced from the website https://kestavakehitys.fi/en/commitment2050. 
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2.2.2. Independent variable 
CEP appears to be the only independent variable in this study. As suggested by previous research 
(Al-Tuwaijari et al., 2004; Cho and Patten, 2007; Clarkson et al., 2008; Luo and Tang, 2014; 
Braam et al., 2016), scaled measures of CEP have been used. These measures include (i) the 
ratio of total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to total revenue (or propensity to emit GHG), (ii) 
the ratio of waste production to total revenue (or propensity to produce waste) and (iii) the ratio 
of water consumption to total revenue (or propensity to consume water) (Braam et al., 2016). 
Higher propensities imply increased amount of GHG emissions, waste production and water 
consumption and thereby inferior EP (Clarkson et al., 2011). Scaled measures of CEP have edge 
over absolute measures of CEP (e.g., the total amount of water consumed) because scaled 
measures consider variations in the output of products and services (Luo and Tang, 2014) and 
thus facilitate comparisons of EP across companies and between different periods (Hoffmann 
and Busch, 2008).  
2.2.3. Control variables 
Consistent with previous studies, this paper controls for the effect of a number of variables 
namely, firm size (FSIZE), profitability (PROF), leverage (LEV), industry (IND) and asset age 
(ASST_AGE). Larger companies are more visible and subject to greater social pressure to 
operate in an environmentally responsible way (Patten, 2002a; Gonzalez-Gonzalez and Ramírez, 
2016). This will, according to legitimacy theory, lead them to make a higher level of disclosures 
about their EP to avoid legitimacy threat (Mobus, 2005) and hence they are more likely to 
purchase VSA to increase the reliability and credibility of the reported information. Hence a 
positive association between FSIZE and VSA is expected. FSIZE is calculated as the natural 
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logarithm of year-end total assets (Gillet-Monjarret, 2015; Ruhnke & Gabriel, 2013; Jaggi et al., 
2018; Al-Shaer and Zaman, 2018). More profitable companies are financially more capable of 
making sustainability decisions such as sustainability investments and purchase of sustainability 
assurance (Ruhnke & Gabriel, 2013). Therefore, a positive linkage between PROF and VSA is 
anticipated. PROF is measured by the return-on-assets (ROA), which is calculated as the ratio of 
year-end net income to year-end total assets (Ruhnke & Gabriel, 2013; Gillet-Monjarret, 2015; 
Peters and Romi, 2015; Al-Shaer and Zaman, 2018). Given that the relationship between LEV 
and VSA is inconclusive (Simnett et al., 2009; Ruhnke & Gabriel, 2013; Gillet-Monjarret, 2015; 
Peters and Romi, 2015; Al-Shaer and Zaman, 2018), it is not possible to anticipate whether LEV 
and VSA are positively or negatively linked (Ruhnke & Gabriel, 2013). Therefore, only a 
significant association between LEV and VSA is assumed. Debt-equity ratio is used as the proxy 
for LEV (Jaggi et al., 2018). Firms belonging to environmentally sensitive (ES) industries face 
greater public pressures related to environmental issues (Kolk and Perego, 2010; Gillet-
Monjarret, 2015; Peters and Romi, 2015) and respond to such pressures by providing 
sustainability information (Gillet-Monjarret, 2015). In order to offer reliability and credibility to 
their sustainability information, ES firms tend to purchase VSA (Kolk and Perego, 2010; Gillet-
Monjarret, 2015; Peters and Romi, 2015). Following prior studies (Patten, 2002b; Clarkson et 
al., 2008; Cho et al., 2014; Yunus et al., 2016), energy, utilities, transportation, pharmaceuticals, 
materials, mining and extractive, paper, chemicals, petroleum, metals, utilities and 
telecommunication industries are considered ES industries. IND is a dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 for ES firms and 0 otherwise (Cho et al., 2014; Yunus et al., 2016). Finally, this study 
controls for ASST_AGE as firms investing in newer and cleaner technologies are likely to cause 
less environmental pollution and tend to inform their stakeholders of such fact through increased 
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environmental disclosures (Clarkson et al., 2008; Moroney et al., 2012). In order to increase 
stakeholders’ confidence in their sustainability reports, they are also likely to implement VSA. 
Consequently, a positive relationship is expected between ASST_AGE and VSA. ASST_AGE is 
measured as the ratio of net properties, plant and equipment to gross properties, plant and 
equipment (Clarkson et al., 2008).        
2.3. Regression model 
To test the proposed hypothesis, the following pooled logistic regression models are estimated: 
VSA= β0 + β1CEP1 + β2CEP3 + β3FSIZE + β4PROF + β5LEV + β6IND + β7ASST_AGE + ε1 (1) 
VSA= β0 + β1CEP2 + β2CEP3 + β3FSIZE + β4PROF + β5LEV + β6IND + β7ASST_AGE + ε2 (2)  
where VSA = voluntary sustainability assurance; CEP = corporate environmental performance 
(CEP1 = the ratio of total GHG emitted to total revenue; CEP2 = the ratio of total water consumed to 
total revenue; CEP3 = the ratio of total waste produced to total revenue); FSIZE = firm size; PROF = 
profitability; LEV = leverage; IND = industry; ASST_AGE = asset age. Table 1 provides the 
summary of the variables used in this study.   
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlations coefficients for the variables used in this study. 
According to Gujarati (1995), multicollinearity exists if the value of the correlation coefficient 
between two independent variables exceeds 0.80. Table 2 shows a correlation of 0.955721 
between CEP1 and CEP2. On the other hand, the correlations among other independent and/or 
control variables are less than 0.50. This clearly indicates the existence of multicollinearity 
between CEP1 and CEP2. In addition, the variance inflation factor (VIF) between CEP1 and CEP2 
amounts to 10.42 which also confirms the presence of multicollinearity between these two 
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measures of corporate environmental performance. As a result, it is not possible to accommodate 
all three proxies for CEP in a single model. 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the total sample. The mean of VSA is 0.57 indicating 
that about 57% of the sustainability reports have been externally assured. As far as CEP 
measures are concerned, a considerable variation is seen in cases of CEP1 and CEP2. For 
example, the mean of CEP1 is 0.48 with minimum and maximum of 0.01 and 5.60 respectively; 
the mean of CEP2 is 46.44 with minimum and maximum of 0.01 and 618.52 respectively. On the 
other hand, CEP3 has a mean of 0.07 with minimum and maximum 0.00 and 0.58, respectively. 
LEV has a mean of 0.47 and PROF has a mean of 0.05. The mean of FSIZE is 6.69 with 
minimum and maximum of 5.68 and 7.58 respectively implying that the sample includes both 
medium and large firms. The mean of IND is 0.77 revealing that around 77% of the sampled 
firms belong to environmentally sensitive industries. The mean of ASST_AGE is 0.43 indicating 
that firms are in possession of older assets.  
3.2. Regression results 
The regression results are presented in Table 4. Two different models have been estimated to 
observe the impact of CEP on the adoption of VSA. In Model 1, CEP is measured as the ratios of 
total GHG emissions to total revenues (CEP1) and total waste produced to total revenues (CEP3); 
whereas in Model 2, the ratios of total water consumed to total revenues (CEP2) and CEP3 are 
used as the indicators of CEP. 
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Model 1 demonstrates that CEP1 is negatively and significantly linked to VSA (p<0.01) 
indicating that firms with better environmental performance (EP) in terms of GHG emissions 
tend to demand for VSA. In addition, FSIZE, a firm-specific control variable, has a significant 
and positive relationship with VSA (p<0.01) suggesting that larger firms are more likely to 
implement VSA. CEP3 and the remaining firm-specific control variables are found to have no 
linkage with VSA.  
Model 2 exhibits a highly significant inverse relationship between CEP2 and VSA  (p<0.01) but 
CEP3 is still found to be insignificant suggesting that firms with better EP in terms of water 
consumption have a tendency to demand for VSA. In addition, except PROF and IND, other 
firm-specific control variables are found to be significant at different conventional levels of 
significance. For instance, FSIZE, ASST_AGE and LEV are statistically significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively, which indicates that larger firms, firms with less polluting new assets and 
low-leverage firms are more inclined to have their sustainability reports externally assured. 
Model 2 also shows an improvement in the model fit (R
2
 improves from 0.30 to 0.43). 
Overall, these findings provide support for the proposed hypothesis that corporate environmental 
performance influences the adoption of voluntary assurance of sustainability reports. Gillet-
Monjarret (2015) asserts that corporate legitimacy can be strengthened if independent assurance 
providers recognize the reliability of the environmental information provided in corporate 
sustainability reports. Therefore, the results of this study are supportive of legitimacy theory 
suggesting that superior environmental performers (companies with lower propensity to emit 
GHG and consume water in this research) show their commitment to maintain and protect the 
natural environment through disclosures of reliable information about their relatively good EP in 
sustainability reports and thus maintain legitimacy. The robustness of legitimacy theory is also 
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confirmed by the significant and positive FSIZE-VSA nexus as well as ASST_AGE-VSA nexus. 
Larger firms, due to their higher visibility and greater public scrutiny, are subject to external 
pressure to report information about their EP; consequently, they are likely to disclose more 
environmental information (Yunus et al., 2016; Kılıç and Kuzey, 2019). In addition, firms with 
newer and less polluting assets are likely to voluntarily provide more environmental information 
to send signals to the market and society in general about their seriousness towards 
environmental responsibilities (Clarkson et al., 2008; Moroney et al., 2012). In both cases, 
disclosing firms are likely to obtain VSA to increase the reliability and credibility of the reported 
information and thus strengthen the legitimacy of their continued existence in society (Deegan 
and Gordon, 1996). A plausible explanation why the propensity to produce waste does not affect 
the adoption of VSA may be that Finnish companies may not yet consider the generation of 
waste an important indicator of EP. 
3.3. Robustness check 
For robustness check, sub-sample analyses have been conducted. In doing so, the whole sample 
has been split into two subsamples: the first subsample covers the period from 2008 to 2011, 
while the second one spans from 2012 to 2015. The results of the subsample analysis are 
presented in Tables 5 and 6. These findings mirror those reported in Table 4. For instance, CEP1 
and CEP2 remain highly significant at conventional levels indicating that these measures have 
emerged as the main determinants of VSA irrespective of the time periods used. However, few 
discrepancies are also observed. For example, while CEP3 is found to have no impact on VSA 
when performing the full period analysis, it has now become significant at 10% level in Model 2. 
Besides, for each sub-sample, the R
2
 statistic improves substantially. To sum up, the results of 
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this empirical research are quite robust as they do not change substantially depending on the time 
periods considered.   
4. Conclusions, Implications and Limitations 
This study advances the literature on voluntary sustainability assurance, which is considered 
important for establishing the reliability and enhancing the credibility of the environmental 
information disclosed in corporate sustainability reports and thus strengthening organizational 
legitimacy. The literature on voluntary sustainability assurance is evolving slowly paying very 
little attention to the relationship between corporate environmental performance and voluntary 
sustainability assurance. This empirical work provides initial evidence of the impact of corporate 
environmental performance on the implementation of voluntary assurance of corporate 
sustainability reports. Drawing on legitimacy theory, the association between different measures 
(propensities to emit GHG, consume water and produce waste) of corporate environmental 
performance and the adoption of voluntary sustainability assurance is tested.  
The results of this study exhibit that Finnish firms with superior environmental performance in 
terms of GHG emissions and water consumption have their sustainability reports externally 
assured. Conforming to legitimacy theory the findings suggest that superior environmental 
performers provide information about their environmental performance in sustainability reports 
with a view to showing their commitment to environmental protection, increase the reliability 
and credibility of the disclosed environmental performance information by adopting voluntary 
sustainability assurance and thus strengthen organizational legitimacy.  
The findings of this study have implications for users of environmental information, managers 
and regulators. The results will enable users of environmental information to judge the reliability 
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and credibility of the information (disseminated via corporate sustainability reports) about 
corporate environmental performance of reporting firms. The external assurance reduces 
corporate management’s opportunity to utilize environmental reporting as a management tool to 
divert public attention from actual environmental performance and hence restores environmental 
information users’ confidence in the credibility of sustainability reports. On the other hand, 
corporate managers will be benefited from the findings of this research by paying attention to the 
provision of reliable environmental information to relevant publics. The supply of reliable 
information to relevant publics will keep them informed that companies are operating within the 
bounds of an acceptable value system. This will help companies maintain legitimacy and ensure 
their continued existence in society. Finally, the results will be important for regulators, who 
may keep an eye on the transparency of firms’ voluntary environmental disclosures. In case 
companies fail to provide reliable and credible information about their environmental 
performance, regulators may develop stringent rules and regulations for complementing 
voluntary sustainability assurance by mandatory requirements for sustainability disclosures and 
assurance.  
This research is subject to certain limitations. First, it is not likely that all companies use the 
same method for measuring their environmental performance and hence the measures of 
corporate environmental performance used in this research may not be exhaustive. In addition, 
the estimated models may not have included all the control variables that can affect the adoption 
of voluntary sustainability assurance. Second, the sample includes only the companies that have 
published sustainability reports. Third, this research is based solely upon Finnish data, which 
may inhibit the generalization of the findings in other contexts but this limitation can be 
overcome in future research by utilizing bigger samples that will include both local and 
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international firms to provide greater understanding of how corporate environmental 
performance affects the adoption of voluntary sustainability assurance. Furthermore, country-
specific studies can also be conducted to facilitate the comparisons of findings. 
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Table 1: Definitions of the variables used  
 
Variable   Definition 
VSA 
 
A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the corporate sustainability report is 
externally assured and 0 otherwise.  
CEP1  
The ratio of total GHG emitted to total revenue. 
CEP2  
The ratio of total water consumed to total revenue. 
CEP3  
The ratio of total waste produced to total revenue. 
FSIZE 
 
The natural logarithm of the company's year-end total assets. 
PROF 
 




Debt-equity ratio measured by dividing total liabilities by total shareholders’ equity.  
IND 
 
A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the company operates in an 
environmentally sensitive industry and 0 otherwise.  
ASST_AGE   
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Table 2: Pearson correlations 
           
                     
 VSA  CEP1 CEP2 CEP3 FSIZE  PROF  LEV  IND  ASST_AGE   
VSA  1.000000          
            
           
CEP1 -0.040849 1.000000         
 (0.668)           
           
CEP2 -0.049241 0.955721 1.000000        
 (0.605) (0.000)          
           
CEP3 0.301587 0.238503 0.254024 1.000000       
 (0.001) (0.011) (0.007)         
           
FSIZE  0.480907 0.413395 0.430682 0.381817 1.000000      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)        
           
PROF  -0.241136 0.147061 0.196042 -0.229287 -0.025959 1.000000     
 (0.110) (0.120) (0.037) (0.015) (0.785)       
           
LEV  0.056238 0.186165 0.192651 0.391599 0.148350 -0.483101 1.000000    
 (0.554) (0.048) (0.041) (0.000) (0.117) (0.000)      
           
IND  -0.011639 0.235478 0.195521 0.283016 -0.083723 -0.096494 0.253414 1.000000   
 (0.903) (0.012) (0.038) (0.002) (0.378) (0.309) (0.007)    
           
ASST_AGE  0.109114 0.471873 0.471209 -0.140997 0.129303 0.067691 -0.189806 -0.065007 1.000000  
 (0.250) (0.000) (0.000) (0.136) (0.172) (0.476) (0.044) (0.494)    
           
Note: VSA = voluntary sustainability assurance; CEP = corporate environmental performance (CEP1 = the ratio of total GHG emitted to total 
revenue; CEP2 = the ratio of total water consumed to total revenue; CEP3 = the ratio of total waste produced to total revenue); FSIZE = firm size; 
PROF = profitability; LEV = leverage; IND = industry; ASST_AGE = asset age; p-values are given in parentheses.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Total sample (N = 176) 
Variable Mean Maxi. Min. Std. Dev. 
VSA 0.57   0.50 
CEP1 0.48 5.60 0.01 1.05 
CEP2 46.44 618.52 0.01 128.14 
CEP3 0.07 0.58 0.00 0.13 
FSIZE 6.69 7.58 5.68 0.43 
PROF 0.05 0.20 -0.09 0.06 
LEV 0.47 2.21 0.02 0.31 
IND 0.77   0.42 
ASST_AGE 0.43 0.70 0.20 0.12 
Note: VSA = voluntary sustainability assurance; CEP = corporate environmental performance (CEP1 = the 
ratio of total GHG emitted to total revenue; CEP2 = the ratio of total water consumed to total revenue; 
CEP3 = the ratio of total waste produced to total revenue); FSIZE = firm size; PROF = profitability; LEV 
= leverage; IND = industry; ASST_AGE = asset age. 
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Table 4: Regression results for the full sample  
 
Dependent variable VSA 
Variable Expected Sign 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Intercept  -28.29*** 6.12 -31.68*** 7.06 
CEP1 +/- -1.05*** 0.33   
CEP2 +/-   -0.01*** 0.004 
CEP3 +/- 1.46 3.03 17.45 11.83 
FSIZE + 4.13*** 0.90 4.46*** 0.99 
PROF + -5.76 4.98 -10.48 6.90 
LEV +/- -0.30 0.91 -2.20* 1.21 
IND + 0.57 0.66 0.92 0.76 









Prob (LR statistic) 
 
0.000000 0.000000 
Note: VSA = voluntary sustainability assurance; CEP = corporate environmental performance (CEP1 = the ratio of total GHG emitted to total 
revenue; CEP2 = the ratio of total water consumed to total revenue; CEP3 = the ratio of total waste produced to total revenue); FSIZE = firm size; 
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Table 5: Regression results for sub-sample I 
 
Dependent variable VSA 
Variable Expected Sign 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Intercept  -28.38*** 10.39 -35.97*** 11.92 
CEP1 +/- -1.45** 0.57   
CEP2 +/-   -0.02*** 0.01 
CEP3 +/- 4.55 3.54 20.37* 12.34 
FSIZE +       3.70*** 1.36 4.42*** 1.49 
PROF + -4.90 7.52 -6.83 8.92 
LEV +/- -2.94 1.89 -5.51* 2.98 
IND + 1.26 1.37 2.23 1.49 









Prob (LR statistic) 
 
0.000414 0.000003 
Note: This table presents the results for sub-sample I which covers the period from 2008 to 2011. VSA = voluntary sustainability assurance; CEP = 
corporate environmental performance (CEP1 = the ratio of total GHG emitted to total revenue; CEP2 = the ratio of total water consumed to total 
revenue; CEP3 = the ratio of total waste produced to total revenue); FSIZE = firm size; PROF = profitability; LEV = leverage; IND = industry; 
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Table 6: Regression results for sub-sample II 
 
Dependent variable VSA 
Variable Expected Sign 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Intercept  -70.61*** 26.52 -111.92** 56.51 
CEP1 +/- -2.49* 1.38   
CEP2 +/-   -0.04** 0.02 
CEP3 +/- 47.27 35.95 133.80* 69.82 
FSIZE + 11.54*** 4.37 19.58* 10.02 
PROF + -24.16* 12.84 -78.34* 44.07 
LEV +/- 0.68 1.98 -6.81* 3.63 
IND + -0.09 1.30 -1.58 2.54 









Prob (LR statistic) 
 
0.000000 0.000000 
Note: This table presents the results for sub-sample II which covers the period from 2012 to 2015.VSA = voluntary sustainability assurance; CEP 
= corporate environmental performance (CEP1 = the ratio of total GHG emitted to total revenue; CEP2 = the ratio of total water consumed to total 
revenue; CEP3 = the ratio of total waste produced to total revenue); FSIZE = firm size; PROF = profitability; LEV = leverage; IND = industry; 
ASST_AGE = asset age. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. 
 
 
